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A NOTE ON MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION AND
RESEARCH V. IANCU
Florence Montarmani*
I. INTRODUCTION
The beauty and appeal of obtaining a patent lies in the right
to use a specific invention for a 20-year period after issuance.1 The
clock begins ticking from the filing date of the application. 2
However, much of the 20-year term is consumed during the
prosecution of a patent: the time between filing a patent application
and receiving approval from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”).3 Patent prosecution can be a
burdensomely,
time-consuming
process
that
averages
approximately 23.8 months—just shy of two years.4
Delays in prosecution of a patent effectively reduce the
enforceable term of the patent by eating away at the 20-year
exclusivity term.5 As a solution to this disparity, the USPTO
adopted the Patent Term Adjustment (“PTA”).6 The PTA
compensates an applicant for “lost time” by extending the life of the
patent on a day-by-day basis, adding one day to the end of the
patent’s life span for each day delayed by the USPTO during
Florence Montarmani is a 2020 DePaul University College of Law J.D.
Candidate. Florence graduated from the Bowling Green State University in 2016,
where she majored in Biology and minored in Chemistry. Florence also received
her MBA from Bowling Green State University in 2017. As a law student,
Florence has focused her efforts on Patent Law, receiving a CALI Excellence for
the Future Award for the study of Patent Law, as well as the Robert and Clytia
Chambers Scholarship Award for the study of Patent Law.
1 Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office, 37 C.F.R. Parts 1 and
3 Changes to Implement 20 Year Patent Term and Provisional Applications,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/con/files/cons096.htm
2 Id.
3 Westlaw Practical Law: Patent Application Prosecution Overview.
4 IP Spotlight: How long does it take to get a patent or trademark? (2018
Update) (Jan 11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/how-long-does-ittake-to-get-a-patent-21821/
5 Dale Fresh, Scott Harper, 2019 TXCLE-AIP 6-V: Patent Term Adjustment
6 Id.
*
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prosecution.7 The idea of the USPTO repaying lost time seems
simple. But there are several concepts that complicate how much
time will be allotted to an applicant.
Part II of this case note will focus on the historical reasoning
behind Patent Term Adjustments and how to calculate different
types of delays.8 Part II will further explain applicant interferences
with PTAs and the idea behind double patenting laws.9 Part III will
focus on the central case for this note, Mayo Foundation for
Medication Education and Research v. Iancu.10 Part IV will
analyze the majority’s holding and dissent’s argument and discuss
which application of the law was correct. 11 Part V will discuss the
implications the holding of Mayo Foundation has on future patent
applications and how patent term adjustments and extensions relate
to double patenting.12 Part VI will summarize why this case topic is
of growing concern in patent law. 13
II. BACKGROUND
The idea of a patent term adjustment was conceived by
Congress in 1994.14 Enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (URAA) led Congress to extend the life of a patent from 17
years, beginning on the effective date of issuance, to twenty years
from the date of filing. 15 The patent term was extended to
compensate for delays in patent prosecution that occur between the
filing of an application and the date of the final issuance. 16 Five
years later, in 1999, Congress expanded the terms of the PTA by

Perkins Coie, LLP. What is Patent Term Adjustment and Why Does It Matter?
(June 30, 2014)
8 See infra notes and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes and accompanying text.
14 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
15 Id.
16 Id.
7
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adding three classes of “delays” that could qualify an applicant for
adjustment.17

18

The premise behind this note begins with the issue of patent
term adjustments as laid out in the case of Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research v. Iancu.19 Although it seems like
a simple concept, the effects of decisions made by the Federal
Circuit in cases such as Mayo Foundation, and several others in
recent years will have major implications on a larger area of patent
law known as double patenting. 20 In order to understand the
relationship, it is important to grasp the concepts individually:
A. Patent Term Adjustment
The foundation of Patent Term Adjustments is laid out in
section 154(b) of the Patent Act. 21 The Act provides three different
circumstances where a patent may be granted an extension of the

Id.
Timeline shows history of patents as they have evolved into having a 20-year
term. Legal Advantage, A Practical Approach to Calculating Patent Term
Adjustment (PTA) (Oct. 17, 2018) https://www.legaladvantage.net/blog/apractical-approach-to-calculate-patent-term-adjustment-pta/
19 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
20 Janice Mueller, Aspen Student Treatise Series: Patent Law (5th Edition, 2016)
“Double patenting is often charged against pharmaceutical firms allegedly
engaged in ‘ever-greening,’ that is, obtaining a series of patents on closely
related drug inventions in an attempt to improperly prolong the patent life of the
firm’s products.”
21 USPTO.gov, 35 U.S.C. 154 Contents and term of patent; provisional rights,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-9015-appxl.html#d0e303482
17
18
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patent term, referred to as “delays.” 22 The USPTO has categorized
the three kinds of delays where an applicant may be entitled to an
adjustment: A delay, B delay, and C delay.23
35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) describes an A delay. 24 This type
of delay lies in the idea that the USPTO should give prompt
responses. Specifically, an A delay is appropriate when:
(i) the USPTO fails to issue a notice, i.e., mail a
restriction requirement, a non-final office action, or a
notice of allowance, within 14 months after the
application filing date
(ii) the USPTO fails to respond to an applicant’s Reply
within 4 months
(iii) the USPTO fails to respond to a Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB) decision within 4 months
(iv) the USPTO fails to issue a patent within 4 months
after issue fee has been paid. 25
For an A delay, the patent term is extended by one day for each day
after the end of each specified period in the statute. 26
35 U.S.C §154(b)(1)(B) explains a B delay as proper where
the USPTO fails to issue a patent within 3 years from its filing
date.27 B delays exclude time consumed by requests for continued
examination (“RCE”) and, appeals or interferences.28
Finally, 35 U.S.C. §154(b)(1)(C) states C delays provide
adjustment for interferences, secrecy orders, and appeals. 29 An
Christina Sperry, Elissa M. Kingsland, Patent Term Adjustment: The Real
Meaning of Applicant Delay (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.mintz.com/insightscenter/viewpoints/2231/2019-02-patent-term-adjustment-real-meaningapplicant-delay
23 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)
24 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B).
28 Id.
29 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C).
22
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appeal can be contributed in a C delay only if it is successful. 30 An
unsuccessful appeal terminates the “B” clock. 31
The total amount of delay time is calculated by adding each
type of delay together, where appropriate, and subtracting any
overlap between the A and B delays. 32 Further reductions in delay
time apply where an applicant fails to “engage in reasonable efforts
to conclude prosecution of the application.” 33 These types of
circumstances can occur when an applicant requires additional time
beyond the expected 3 months to respond to an office action, filing
non-responsive replies, or perhaps when an applicant submits
supplemental replies and documents which are not expressly
requested by the patent examiner. 34
PTA = (PTO Delay A + PTO Delay B + PTO Delay C –
Overlap – Applicant’s delay), where PTA>=0 35
B. Requests for Continued Examinations Pertaining to B Delays
The central issue of this note and Mayo Foundation
concerns the calculation of B Delays due to an RCE.36 An RCE
allows for continued examination even after the patent examiner has
issued an applicant a final rejection.37 The premise behind an RCE
is essentially a “do-over”—to start again at the initial office action

Id.
Id.
32 Norris McLaughlin, Calculating Patent Term Adjustment (PTA)—An
Overview (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://norrismclaughlin.com/tap/2018/10/19/calculating-patent-termadjustment-pta-an-overview/
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Legal Advantage, A Practical Approach to Calculating Patent Term
Adjustment (PTA) (Oct. 17, 2018) https://www.legaladvantage.net/blog/apractical-approach-to-calculate-patent-term-adjustment-pta/
36 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
37 Gene Quinn, Michael Benson, Understanding U.S. Patent Prosecution (June
30, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/30/understanding-u-s-patentprosecution/id=98955/
30
31
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and go through the steps of prosecution again. 38 The seminal case
of Novartis AG v. Lee, held that once an RCE has been filed, there
is no B delay available for any time during the continued
examination.39 If an RCE was filed during prosecution of an
application, applicants are entitled to B delays for the time period
between allowance and issuance. 40
C. Double Patenting
Double patenting prevents the issuance of more than one
patent on a claimed invention. 41 There are two types of double
patenting issues that the USPTO recognizes: (1) same-invention
type and (2) obviousness-type (“OTDP”).42 Same-invention type
double patenting is a statutory concept stemming from 35 U.S.C. §
101, which states that an inventor “may obtain a patent.” 43 On the
contrary, OTDP is a non-statutory concept, which occurs when an
applicant attempts to claim an invention that is an obvious variant
of the original patent.44 Thus, the purpose behind rejecting double
patents is to prevent a patentee from extending their patent
monopoly beyond the statutorily prescribed term. 45
Although two separate concepts, OTDP and PTAs can
become entangled. A prevalent issue arises when two patents share
a common priority date because one was filed as a continuation of
the other but happen to have different expiration dates due to the
PTA.46 Recent holdings such as Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, LLC.
and Mayo Foundation will affect the future of patent terms and
overcoming double patenting rejections. 47
Id.
Novartis AG v. Lee, 740 F.3d 593 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
40 Id.
41 Janice Mueller, Aspen Student Treatise Series: Patent Law (5th Edition,
2016).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Arpita Bchattcharyya, Timothy McAnulty, CIPA Journal US Update: Double
Patenting (May 2019).
47 Id.
38
39
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III. MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION
AND RESEARCH V. IANCU
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff, Mayo, is a Minnesota non-profit corporation and
owner of United States Patent No. 8,981,063 (‘063 patent). 48 The
‘063 patent is related to antibodies that bind to polypeptides, which
are useful in treating immunosuppression disease conditions such as
cancer, AIDS and other virally or environmentally-induced
conditions, and even certain congenital immune deficiencies.49
Mayo filed Application No. 12/421,310 (‘310 application) on April
9, 2009.50 The ‘063 patent was issued from the ‘310 application. 51
But on October 14, 2010 the USPTO issued a final office action
rejecting all of the claims in the ‘310 application as anticipated by
U.S. Patent No. 7,635,757 (‘757 patent), and a few claims for
lacking written description. 52 Come September 14, 2011, Mayo
filed an RCE pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 132(b),53 arguing that its
application had priority of invention over the ‘757 patent. 54 Mayo
also filed a supplemental amendment that cancelled some claims
which the examiner had noted should be removed as to not interfere
in upcoming PTA calculations. 55 Mayo thus cancelled the claims
and pursued them in a continuation application, issued as U.S.
Patent 8,460,927 (‘927 patent). 56

Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 425 (E.D. Va. 2018).
Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 35 U.S.C. § 132(b). Notice of Rejection; Reexamination
“The Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the continued
examination of applications for patent at the request of the applicant. The
Director may establish appropriate fees for such continued examination and
shall provide a 50 percent reduction in such fees for small entities that qualify
for reduced fees under section 41(h)(1).”
54 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018).
55 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
56 Id.
48
49
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On February 9, 2012, the Administrative Patent Judge
issued a declaration of interference57 between the remaining claims
of the ‘310 application and all of the claims in the ‘757 patent. 58
Finally, two years later on February 19, 2014, the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) awarded the ‘310 application claims
priority and cancelled all of the claims contained in the ‘757
patent.59 The interference was considered final when the period for
appeal expired on April 23, 2014. 60
After the termination of interference, the examiner
conducted a further prior art search of the ‘310 application, which
led to the issuance of an Office Action on June 30, 2014 that rejected
some claims in the application on grounds of non-statutory
obviousness-type double patenting, in light of the ‘927 patent. 61 The
rejections contended that the ’927 patent contained claims that had
been cancelled in the ‘310 application.62 On October 24, 2014,
Mayo filed a reply to the examiner, arguing that the claims
contained in the ‘310 application were patentably distinct from the
ones in the ‘927 patent.63 A notice of allowance was then mailed on
November 3, 2014 and finally the ‘310 application was issued as the
‘063 patent on March 17, 2015. 64
The following timeline65 provided by Mayo sets forth the
dates and prosecution history described above:
According to the USPTO “An interference is declared to assist the Director of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office in determining priority, that is,
which party first invented the commonly claimed invention within the meaning
of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1).”
MPEP § 2301.03 reads:
“An interference exists if the subject matter of a claim of one party would, if
prior art, have anticipated or rendered obvious the subject matter of a claim of
the opposing party and vice versa.”
58 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Mayo Clinic Found. v. Iancu, 309 F.Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Va. 2018).
65 Photo indicates prosecution timeframe for the ‘310 application and ‘063
patent
57
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Calculation of the Patent Term Adjustment:
Following the issuance of the ‘063 patent, the USPTO had to
calculate the number of PTA days allotted to Mayo. 66 Although the
PTO found both A and C delays, it ultimately determined no B
delays attributable to Mayo.67 The PTO calculated a total of 62168
days of PTA, where Mayo’s calculation reflected 685 days.69
Mayo’s calculation included the PTO’s reopening of prosecution
after the termination of interference. 70 This is where the
disagreement at suit stemmed. The PTO asserted that continued
examination time did not end at termination of interference, but
rather at the mailing of the Notice of Allowance. 71

Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
66 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
67 Id.
68 Footnote 1 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu.,
2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) indicates: “Both
Mayo and the PTO have since change their PTA calculations...Mayo now
claims 723 days, while the PTO has finally determined the Mayo is due 604
days.”
*Hereinafter, this note will refer to the new PTA calculations.*
69 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
70 Id at *7-8.
71 Id at *8.
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The PTA calculation dispute resulted in Mayo filing for appeal to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia.72 The district court ultimately upheld the PTO’s patent
term adjustment determination. 73 Mayo then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 74 On September 16,
2019, the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO and district court’s
determination for the length of PTA allotted to Mayo.75
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
2019 Opinion
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in favor of the
nonmovant.76 The Federal Circuit determined that it must set aside
a PTO action only if the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right.”77 The issue on appeal was one of statutory
interpretation, and therefore was also reviewed de novo.78
i. Statutory interpretation: “request” for examination
On appeal, Mayo set forth its argument based 35 U.S.C. §
154(b)(1)(B)(i), which defines PTA as:
(B) Guarantee of no more than 3-year application
pendency.—Subject to the limitations under paragraph
(2), if the issue of an original patent is delayed due to the
failure of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
to issue a patent within 3 years after the actual filing date

Id at *1.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
76 Id at *10.
77 Id.
78 Id.
72
73
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of the application under section 111(a) in the United
States or, in the case of an international application, the
date of commencement of the national stage under
section 371 in the international application, not
including:
(i)

any time consumed by continued
examination of the application requested
by the applicant under section 132(b). 79

Mayo contented it never “requested” an examination after the
USPTO’s remand, and therefore a post-examination after
interference was wrongfully attributed to Mayo’s request.80 Mayo
read the statute as only allowing declaration of an interference if at
least some claims are deemed allowable but for the outcome of the
interference.81 On the other hand, the PTO contented that an
interference does not close prosecution on the merits and that its
operating procedures contemplate that examination may continue
afterward.82
On the first argument, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
PTO.83 The Federal Circuit acknowledged Mayo’s idea that the
PTO regulations do in fact indicate at least one claim in an
application should be in condition for allowance prior to the
declaration of an interference. 84 However, the Federal Circuit noted
that the regulations also grant the Board power to recommend any
further action by the examiner, including issuing a rejection. 85 The
Court held that collectively, the PTO’s regulations do not indicate
that a declaration of interference is equivalent to a Notice of
Allowance.86
35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(i)
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id at *12.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019)
79
80
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The Federal Circuit also commented on Mayo’s
interpretation of the term “requested,” stating that 37 C.F.R. §
1.703(b)(1) does not reflect an erroneous interpretation of the statute
as Mayo accused. 87 Rather, the Court believed Mayo placed too
much weight on the term, which in fact does not bear much
significance at all. 88
ii. Novartis framework
Looking to the decision in Novartis v. AG Lee, Mayo argued
that an allowance under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) is analogous to a
declaration of interference. 89 Mayo contended that claims in a patent
are otherwise “deemed allowable” by examiners before interference
is declared.90 Specifically, Mayo meant that under USPTO
regulations, a declaration of an interference comprises an indication
of allowability and that examination concludes once the claims are
“deemed allowable.”91 Using this framework, Mayo believed that
because claims had to be deemed allowable in order to declare an
interference, the post-interference proceedings were at the request
of the examiner, because Mayo’s claims were already allowable
prior to interference.92
In response to the Novartis argument set forth by Mayo, the
PTO claimed prosecution does not close simply due to a declaration
of interference and further examination may continue after the
fact.93 Using a policy standpoint, the PTO also expressed that if
Mayo’s argument were allowed, PTA calculations would become
“wildly impractical” and “hotly contested factual inquiry in nearly
every PTA case.”94
Id at *13.
Id at *13-14.
89 Id at *11.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
93 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
94 Id.
87
88
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Again, the Federal Circuit sided with the PTO. 95 Citing to
its holding in Novartis, the Federal Circuit explains “[t]he time
between the date of mailing of the Notice of Allowance and the
issuance is not RCE time, absent special circumstances where
examination is reopened after allowance, because examination of
the merits closes upon allowance in the great majority of cases.” 96
Following the prosecution history, the PTO explained that the
examiner for Mayo had the authority to update the prior art search
upon remand and issue a rejection as it saw fit. 97 Mayo then
succeeded in its response to the examiner, which then secured
allowance—not prior to interference as Mayo believes.98 However,
the Court explains that following this timeline, it shows that
examination ended once the Notice of Allowance was mailed—not
at the expiration of interference. 99
iii. Holding
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court, holding the USPTO correctly determined there was no B
Delay to be granted to Mayo. 100
C. Dissent
In a dissent by Judge Newman, he stated his disagreement
with the majority’s holding that post-interference examination
period is not included in the patent term adjustment. 101 Newman’s
reasoning is reflected in his belief that the majority’s holding does

Id at *12-13.
Id at *13.
97 Id.
98 Id at *14.
99 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *13 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
100 Id at *16.
101 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *17 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
95
96
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not align with the statutory provisions and precedent regarding
PTAs.102
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s use of 37 C.F.R. §
1.703(b)(1) as limiting the patent term adjustment after continued
examination was requested. 103 In agreement with Mayo’s argument,
the dissent read that § 1.703(b)(1) “was adopted to establish that the
period of examination ends with mailing of the notice of allowance;
it has no relation to post-interference examination.”104
The dissent argued the application of Novartis was
erroneous, as the case did not relate to prosecution or activity prior
to the Notice of Allowance. 105 Rather, Novartis was “concerned
only with the ‘time from allowance to issuance.’”106 Newman stated
there was no dispute to whether the PTO had authority to reopen
examination after the termination of interference; citing to MPEP §
2308107, further examination, when there is no recommendation in
the interference judgment, is at the initiative of the examiner. 108
Finally, the dissent pointed to Congressional intent of term
adjustments. The intentions behind PTAs are to penalize only those
who purposely manipulate the system, which does not apply in
Mayo’s case.109 In terms of purpose, § 1.703(b)(1) requires
Id.
Id at *19.
104 Id.
105 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
106 Id.
107 MPEP § 2308
“If there is no recommendation in the judgment, the examiner should update the
search and may, but is not required to, reopen prosecution for any claim not
disposed of in the judgment. An interference judgment simply resolves any
question of priority between the two parties to the interference. The judgment
does not prevent the examiner from making a rejection in further examination in
the same application or a different application.”
108 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
109 Id at *24.
102
103
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examination delay to be requested by the applicant, which is also
not the case for Mayo. 110 Therefore, the interference delay should
be part of the adjustment calculations.111
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Interpretation
Mayo argues that the court’s reading of 37 C.F.R. §
1.703(b)(1) misrepresents the meaning of RCE, as it is defined in
the statute.112 Where 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B)(i) states that time
consumed by continued examination requested by the applicant is
not included in PTA time, Mayo argues that it did not “request”
examination following the Board’s remand. 113 37 C.F.R. §
41.127(c) states that an interference judgment may include
recommendations for further action by the examiner or the Board,
and if the Board recommends rejection of a claim of an involved
application, the examiner “must enter and maintain the
recommended rejection...”114 Mayo’s interference proceedings did
not contain any further recommendation actions by the Board. 115
The dissent used MPEP § 2308116 for guidance on when there is no
further recommendations to be taken. 117 In such instances, the
“examiner should update the search and may, but is not required to,
reopen prosecution for any claim not disposed of in the
judgment.”118 Moreover, § 2308 interprets an interference as
solving questions of priority between two parties; it does not prevent

Id.
Id at *24-25.
112 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See supra note 97.
117 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
118 Id.
110
111
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an examiner from making rejections in further examination of the
same application.119
Using the MPEP as guidance, since no recommendation for
further action was provided by the examiner during the interference,
the language makes clear that the examiner should update the search
but “[i]s not required to, reopen prosecution.”120 The decision to
make further examinations is clearly given to the examiner.121
Although Mayo requested the initial RCE, it did not ask for
continued examination after the termination of interference.122
Rather, the examiner chose to further examine the claim language
of the ‘310 application for obviousness-type double patenting.123
The majority made the argument that because Mayo made the initial
request and that prosecution does not end until the mailing of the
notice of allowance, that all time after interference is part of the
RCE time and will not be allotted any PTA.124 Through this
framework, the majority seems to believe that RCE is all
encompassing and even includes examination of aspects that the
applicant did not specifically ask for. The code of federal
regulations and MPEP plainly set out the road map that post
interference examination is a decision attributed to the examiner and
is not encompassed in a continued examination request by the
applicant.125
B. Application of Novartis
Both parties make strong arguments regarding when a claim
is “deemed allowable” based on the holding of Novartis. The
premise of Novartis was that examination ends at the notice of
allowance rather than the issue date of a patent. 126 The Novartis
Id.
Id.
121 Id.
122 Id at *23.
123 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *23 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
124 Id.
125 Id at *22-23.
126 Id at *21.
119
120
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conclusion only settles the question in so far as disregarding time
between the notice of allowance and the date of issuance, which is
not at dispute in Mayo Foundation.127 As the majority also states in
Mayo Foundation regarding Novartis, “[e]xamination as used in §
154(b)(1)(B) ‘presumptively ends at allowance, when prosecution
is closed and there is no further examination on the merits in the
absence of a special reopening.” 128 The majority’s reading of the
Novartis case is correct. Novartis was concerned with when
prosecution ends; it is clear that prosecution ends at the notice of
allowance instead of the issue date. 129 After a notice of allowance
there are no longer any prosecution steps by the examiner; control
of the patent leaves the hands of the examiner and goes into the
hands of the publisher—therefore, it is presumed that prosecution
ends at the notice of allowance. 130 But it is important to consider, as
the dissent points out, the case at hand is not regarding when
prosecution ends.131 Rather, Mayo Foundation concerns when
prosecution time attributed to fault of the applicant ends.132
Specifically, the case at hand asks if post interference examination
is a continuation of RCE at the expense of the applicant, or if it is a
separate examination at the hands of the examiner. 133 Although the
reading of Novartis is correct, it is not correct in terms of Mayo’s
issues. The dissent correctly argues that Novartis is not applicable
in Mayo’s case because it was merely concerned with establishing
the meaning of the time between the mailing of the Notice of
Allowance and the issuance of the patent. 134

Id.
Id.
129 Novartis AG v. Lee, 740 F.3d 593 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
130 Changes to Patent Term Adjustment in view of the Federal Circuit Decision
in Novartis v. Lee, 80 Fed. Reg. 1346,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/01/09/2015-00061/changes-topatent-term-adjustment-in-view-of-the-federal-circuit-decision-in-novartis-v-lee
131 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
132 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
133 Id.
134 Id at *21.
127
128
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C. Did the majority get it right?
The majority’s firm opinion seems flawed. If the purpose of
patent term adjustments is to compensate the patentee for delay
caused by the USPTO during prosecution, then it should do so
wholly. The dispute in Mayo Foundation is over 112 days-, yet the
time taken to appeal the case took well over 100 days. 135 PTA is
compensated to patentees so long as there is no sense of misleading
or deceiving the patent office. 136 It was not disputed that Mayo did
not try to deceive the patent office.137 During prosecution Mayo
played by the rules and did just as the examiner asked every step of
the way.138 It is counterintuitive, in light of the purpose behind
obtaining a patent, for PTAs to penalize an applicant for abiding by
the requests of the examiner but not being properly compensated for
their efforts.
Matters of this sort should be saved for the court in cases
where a patentee is clearly attempting to take advantage of the
patent office and term adjustments to their patent. In cases where no
such deceit is in dispute, it would be better for the examiners, patent
office, and courts to spend their time consulting issues of greater
importance. Judgments such as the one the majority made here will
only add reasons to dissuade people from applying for patents—the
complete opposite of the intent for patents.139

Footnote 1 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
Iancu., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27771, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) indicates:
“Both Mayo and the PTO have since change their PTA calculations...Mayo now
claims 723 days, while the PTO has finally determined the Mayo is due 604
days.”
136 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *24 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019)(Newman, C.J.,
dissenting)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 106-287, pt. 1, at 49-50 (1999)).
137 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *24 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
138 Id at *24.
139 Joe Hadzima, Boston Business Journal, The Importance of Patents: It Pays
to Know Patent Rules, http://web.mit.edu/e-club/hadzima/the-importance-ofpatents.html
135
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF MAYO ON DOUBLE PATENTING
The primary focus of Mayo Foundation is the discrepancy
of days calculated between Mayo and the PTO regarding delay time
allotted for the patent term adjustment. 140 Although the outcome of
the case is focused on calculation of PTA days, the holding can have
greater implications on patents, specifically regarding obviousnesstype double patenting.
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Novartis Pharms.
Corp. v. Ezra Ventures LLC, shows how obviousness-type double
patenting is affected by Patent Term Extensions (“PTE”). 141 Ezra
narrows the reach of OTDP by holding a PTE is valid “as long as
the extended patent is otherwise valid without the extension.”142 The
Novartis patent was granted PTE time due to FDA delays during the
drug approval process.143 Novartis filed for infringement when Ezra
attempted to market a generic version of the patented drug.144 The
PTE for Novartis extended the patent’s term beyond that of a laterfiled patent claiming the treatment methods of using the drug’s
active ingredients.145 In defense, Ezra claimed that OTDP cuts
Novartis’ PTE time. 146 The Court ultimately held that OTDP is a
“judge-made doctrine” whose purpose is to prevent PTE beyond a
statutory time limit.147 Since PTE is a statutorily defined concept,

Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
141 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
142Jo Dale Carothers, The IP Blog, Federal Circuit Narrows Reach of
Obviousness-Type Double Patenting (Dec. 20, 2018)
https://www.theiplawblog.com/2018/12/articles/patent-law/federal-circuitnarrows-reach-of-obviousness-type-double-patenting/
143 Payal Majumdar, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Does Not Invalidate
Patent Term Extensions (Feb. 1, 2019)
https://oshaliang.com/uncategorized/obviousness-type-double-patenting-doesnot-invalidate-patent-term-extensions/
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
140
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allowing OTDP to curtail PTE would be beyond the scope of
purpose for obviousness-type double patenting.148
Without prior knowledge or context, it is easy to assume that
a patent term adjustment is equivalent to a patent term extension.
The concepts are similar—they add additional time to the life of a
patent that has been otherwise consumed by the prosecution
process.149 A PTE is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 156 and is applicable
when the patent applicant is responsible for prosecution delays. 150
On the contrary, a PTA is appropriate when an application has been
delayed because of the USPTO.151
Through cases like Ezra, and other recent decisions such as
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v Natco Pharma Ltd.,152 the Federal Circuit
has opened the scope of PTEs so that obviousness-type double
patenting is not able to interfere with the life of a patent. However,
courts have yet to determine how OTDP plays a role in cases with
patent term adjustments rather than extensions. The basis of Ezra is
that OTDP is a judge-made doctrine aimed at preventing a patent’s
span beyond its “statutorily afforded term.” 153 Since PTE is a

Arpita Bchattcharyya, Timothy McAnulty, CIPA Journal Double Patenting
(Jan. 2017).
149 Thomas L. Irving, Jill K. MacAlpine, Charles E. Van Horn, Patent Term
Adjustments and Extensions: Leveraging Recent Decisions and USPTO Rule
Changes (Oct. 11, 2018). http://media.straffordpub.com/products/patent-termadjustments-and-extensions-leveraging-recent-decisions-and-uspto-rulechanges-2018-10-11/presentation.pdf
150 35 U.S.C. § 156.
(a)The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or
a method of manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this
section from the original expiration date of the patent, which shall include any
patent term adjustment granted under section 154(b), if—
151 Thomas L. Irving, Jill K. MacAlpine, Charles E. Van Horn, Patent Term
Adjustments and Extensions: Leveraging Recent Decisions and USPTO Rule
Changes (Oct. 11, 2018). http://media.straffordpub.com/products/patent-termadjustments-and-extensions-leveraging-recent-decisions-and-uspto-rulechanges-2018-10-11/presentation.pdf
152 Gilead Sciences, Inc. v Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
153 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
148
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statutory concept, it therefore cannot be invalidated using OTDP.154
On the same note, it could be presumed that future case holdings
regarding PTAs will align with the Ezra outcome as well. If future
courts stay in line with Ezra, the idea of OTDP will immensely
change patent law. From the perspective of a patent applicant, they
will be afforded greater protection and longer rights to their family
of patents, by being able to claim virtually the same claims with just
a few slight changes, to extend the life of that patent. On the flipside,
applying the Ezra reasoning works against the purpose of having a
patent: establishing a 20 year monopoly but then allowing the rest
of the market a chance to benefit off the claimed ideas and
concepts.155 The narrowing framework of disallowing OTDP to
curtail a statutory adjustment is beneficial to the patent applicants
and potentially very harmful to future American innovators.
The statutory language of section 156 states that the term of
the patent “shall be extended...from the original expiration date of
the patent, which shall include any patent term adjustment granted
under section 154(b)...”156 (emphasis added). A literal reading of the
statute indicates that a patent term adjustment is included in a patent
term extension. Although the issue of ODTP has not been addressed
in courts as it pertains to PTAs, it could be implied through section
156 that because PTAs are included in PTE calculations—and PTAs
are also a statutory doctrine—that their treatment in regards to
ODTP should resemble that of PTEs. In Gilead, the court held that
the expiration date of the patents should be looked at to determine
an ODTP reference and how to overcome it. 157 If a PTA is thus
treated like a PTE in regard to double patenting rejections, this
means that an applicant will be allotted the additional PTA days
owed by the USPTO regardless. Applying the limiting ODTP
results from Ezra, an application requiring PTA will be able to
continue its life without worrying about a non-statutory double
patenting rejection.
Id.
James Yang, OC Patent Lawyer Purpose of the patent system (April 11,
2018) https://ocpatentlawyer.com/lesson/purpose-benefits-patent-system/
156 See supra note 139.
157 Gilead Sciences, Inc. v Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
154
155
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Since cases of PTAs and obviousness-type double patenting
have not been litigated, it is still up in the air as to how a court would
rule on this type of matter. 158 A court could treat it like Ezra and
Gilead, such as the scenario described above. On the other hand, a
court could also decide to not apply the narrowing scope of Ezra to
PTAs and instead keep it only to PTEs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Mayo Foundation conveys that if an
interference was declared during prosecution, even without the
request of the applicant, the applicant is responsible for the delay
time.159 The outcome of Mayo Foundation penalizes applicants for
the prosecution process in which interference was due to the
examiner. Although the majority explained the Novartis case
correctly, it failed to properly apply the case to the matter at hand.
The question surrounding Novartis was profoundly different than
the one faced in Mayo Foundation.160 While Novartis focused on
the expiration of a patent at either the notice of allowance or date of
issuance, Mayo Foundation’s question relied on the determination
of post interference delay and who (applicant or examiner) is
responsible for the delay. 161 The dissent correctly argued that the
post interference delay in Mayo Foundation was at the fault of the
examiner and not Mayo. The examiner had the right to open
examination after the expiration of interference but was not required
to do so.162 Thus, it only seems logical that the post interference
Payal Majumdar, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Does Not Invalidate
Patent Term Extensions (Feb. 1, 2019)
https://oshaliang.com/uncategorized/obviousness-type-double-patenting-doesnot-invalidate-patent-term-extensions/
159 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019).
160 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
161 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Iancu., 2019 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27771, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (Newman, C.J.,
dissenting).
162 Id.
158
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proceedings were at the discretion of the examiner. Mayo followed
all the steps requested by the examiner, and at no point attempted to
deceive the patent office. 163 Yet, in the end, was punished for
following the rules.164 The majority’s opinion shifts focus from the
purpose of granting patents and instead places additional roadblocks
in front of applicants.
The dispute over a few months delay seems trivial in light
of the fact that patents have a 20-year life span. Although the Mayo
PTA dispute did not involve a significant amount of time, each day
is crucial for the patent applicant. The lifespan of a patent can affect
other patents within the family of patents. 165 Regarding OTDP,
there have been no cases that rule on PTAs. 166 However, if courts
take the same approach to OTDP in patent term adjustments, as they
did for patent term extensions in Novartis v. Ezra, it becomes crucial
to properly calculate the delay days returned to the patent. If,
however, a court does not apply the Ezra reasoning associated with
PTEs to PTA circumstances, such as what is presented in Mayo
Foundation, there will still be implications. Obtaining a patent is
already a cumbersome and timely process.167 The additional
challenge of worrying over lost time caused by the examiner, but
taken at the expense of the applicant, only hinders the process and
purpose of obtaining a patent. The overall purpose of obtaining an
exclusive right is to promote innovation. 168 This purpose cannot be
upheld if the focus of courts remains on such small matters between
an applicant and the examiner. Depending on the patent’s timeline,
it can either give more power to the patentee or take away power
Id.
Id.
165 Elizabeth A. Doherty, Amelia Feulner Baur, Navigating through the
Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Minefield (Jan. 2018).
166 Payal Majumdar, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Does Not Invalidate
Patent Term Extensions (Feb. 1, 2019)
https://oshaliang.com/uncategorized/obviousness-type-double-patenting-doesnot-invalidate-patent-term-extensions/
167 IP Spotlight: How long does it take to get a patent or trademark? (2018
Update) (Jan 11, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/how-long-does-ittake-to-get-a-patent-21821/
168 James Yang, OC Patent Lawyer Purpose of the patent system (April 11,
2018) https://ocpatentlawyer.com/lesson/purpose-benefits-patent-system/
163
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from the patentee, to protect related patents within the family and
withstand an OTDP reference.
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